



THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA.

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the war in Afghanistan and this war's influences on the US Foreign Policy in Central Asia namely in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. How the war started? What were the reasons for this bloody war? Moreover, this article discusses US Foreign Policy in the area of Afghanistan before the war and after. It also highlights the US Foreign Policy transformation in Central Asia due to this war in Afghanistan.

Introduction.

The Taliban, a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist and predominantly Pashtun movement, controlled most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. In October 2001, U.S. and allied forces invaded the country and quickly ousted the Taliban regime following its refusal to hand over terrorist leader Osama bin Laden in the wake of al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks. Following the U.S.-led invasion, Taliban leadership relocated to southern Afghanistan and across the border to Pakistan, from where they waged an insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul, Afghan national security forces, and international coalition troops. When the U.S.-led coalition formally ended its combat mission in 2014, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was put in charge of Afghanistan's security; however, the forces faced significant challenges in holding territory and defending population centers. The Taliban continued to attack rural districts and carry out suicide attacks in major cities, with the ANDSF suffering heavy casualties in recent years. The war largely remained a stalemate for nearly six years, despite a small U.S. troop increase in 2017, continuing combat missions, and a shift in U.S. military strategy to target Taliban revenue sources, which involved air strikes against drug labs and opium production sites. The Taliban briefly seized the capital of Farah Province in May 2018, and, in August 2018, it captured the capital of Ghazni Province, holding the city for nearly a week before U.S. and Afghan troops regained control.

The Afghan crisis has had the most serious impact on the situation in the states of Central Asia (CA) for more than two decades. World and regional powers actively or passively

use it to achieve their geopolitical and geo-economic goals. The United States justified its military presence in the region by accusing the Taliban of harboring international terrorists who attacked Washington and New York on September 11, 2001. It seems that as long as Russia and China do not strengthen their positions in Afghanistan, it will be beneficial for them to maintain instability in this country. In turn, Iran is wasting no time building a transport infrastructure to provide inland states with access to the Persian Gulf through its territory. Until now, the studies of experts on the Afghan problem have dealt with security issues: the threats of international terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. Many works are devoted to the Afghan and Central Asian policies of the leading states of the world, seeking to establish their influence in this region. After the collapse of the USSR, the West actively contributed to the formation and strengthening of the statehood of the former Soviet republics with the aim of gaining full independence and moving them away from Russia. In this regard, we can note such initiatives as the Technical Assistance Program for the CIS Countries (TASSh, since 1991), NATO's Partnership for Peace (since 1994; Centrazbat was created in 1997), the International Program for Cooperation in energy sector between the EU and partner countries (INOGATE, since 1995), Central Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia Transport Corridor (SHASESA, since 1998), Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (since 1994; first oil pumping took place in July 2006), as well as the unification of a group of states (GUUAM, since 1997) along the southern borders of Russia. In March 1999, the US Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act, which spoke of supporting the economic and political independence of the Central Asian countries. However, these efforts to form and strengthen centrifugal tendencies in the post-Soviet space and move Central Asia away from Russia could not stop the formation of promising regional cooperation structures. In addition, US and European assistance to the newly independent states was insignificant and mostly of a technical nature; This is also acknowledged by Western experts. In 2000, an agreement on the establishment of the EurAsEC was signed in Astana and the Anti-Terrorist Center of the CIS member countries was created; Within the framework of the Commonwealth, work has begun on the formation of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of Central Asia. military accelerated the pace of its troop withdrawal. By the end of July 2021, the United States had completed nearly 95 percent of its withdrawal, leaving just 650 troops to protect the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

In the summer of 2021, the Taliban continued its offensive, threatening government-controlled urban areas and seizing several border crossings. In early August, the Taliban began direct assaults on multiple urban areas, including Kandahar in the south and Herat in the west. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured the capital of southern Nimruz Province, the first provincial capital to fall. After that, provincial capitals began to fall in rapid succession. Within days, the Taliban captured more than ten other capitals, including Mazar-i-Sharif in the north and Jalalabad in the east, leaving Kabul the only major urban area under government control. On August 15, 2021, over two weeks before the official U.S. withdrawal deadline, Taliban fighters entered the capital. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani subsequently fled the country and the Afghan government collapsed. Later that same day, the Taliban announced they had entered the presidential palace, taken control of Kabul, and were establishing checkpoints to maintain security.

The speed of the Taliban's territorial gains and collapse of both the ANDSF and Afghan government surprised U.S. officials and allies—as well as, reportedly, the Taliban itself—

despite earlier intelligence assessments of the situation on the ground. Following the Taliban's take-over on August 15, 2021, the Biden administration authorized the deployment of an additional five thousand troops to assist with the evacuation of U.S. and allied personnel, as well as thousands of Afghans who worked with the United States and were attempting to flee. On August 26, 2021, two suicide bombings outside the Kabul airport killed at least 169 Afghans and thirteen U.S. troops. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attacks. August 26, 2021, was the deadliest day for U.S. troops in Afghanistan since 2011. On August 31, 2021, the Pentagon announced the completion of the U.S. troop withdrawal, with remaining U.S. personnel and citizens having to rely on diplomatic channels to evacuate.

The United States has an interest in attempting to preserve the many political, human rights, and security gains that were achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. The Taliban takeover of the country could once again turn Afghanistan into a terrorist safe haven, as the group is believed to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. The takeover also threatens to reverse advances made in securing the rights of women and girls, many of which have already been significantly eroded. Moreover, increasing internal instability, a mass exodus of refugees, and a growing humanitarian crisis further exacerbated by climate change and global food and energy markets could have regional spillover effects. Additionally, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia are all likely to compete for influence in Kabul and with subnational actors.

In June 2001, with the participation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established, which testified to the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed; work began on the creation of an anti-terrorist structure of the SCO; there was a process of transforming the Collective Security Treaty (this organization was established on May 14, 2002) into a full-fledged organization - this issue became especially relevant after the Batken events of 1999 and 2000. Undoubtedly, one of the factors that influenced the processes taking place in the Central Asian countries is the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan: the threats to secular states from radical organizations of political Islam have increased significantly, and this circumstance forces them to turn to Russia for military-technical assistance. The decision to establish the CSBR was adopted at the Collective Security Council in Yerevan on May 25, 2001. It consists of about 1,500 people with standard weapons and military equipment from the armed forces of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Back in January 2001, the Republic of Uzbekistan expressed its readiness to take part in the cooperation of the "Shanghai Five" on the basis of full membership, President I. Karimov took part in the Dushanbe summit in 2000 as an observer. The project of laying a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan has come to a standstill; in 1998, the American company Unocal left the project. In early 2000, having agreed to pump its gas through Russia, Turkmenistan practically refused to participate in the construction project of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to the borders of Turkey. Thus, the United States, having launched an antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, tried to radically change the political and economic situation in the region, stabilize Afghanistan and provide Central Asia and Kazakhstan with an alternative access to the ports of the Indian Ocean. In addition, it was extremely important for the United States to destroy the "Afghan threat" that was pushing the countries of the region towards Russia and China. The successful start of the military operation, as well as the adoption of the Constitution, the election of the

president and the formation of the Afghan government, it would seem, testified to the emerging favorable prospects for organizing and promoting regional economic cooperation with the participation of Afghanistan. The widespread opinion that by 2005 the situation in Afghanistan began to improve is indirectly confirmed by the relevant paragraph of the declaration of the SCO Summit held on July 5, 2005 in Astana. It refers to the positive dynamics in the stabilization of the internal political situation, the completion of the active military phase of the anti-terrorist operation and the need to determine the timing of the withdrawal of foreign military contingents from the territory of the SCO member countries. On June 1, 2004, the US-CA Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment (TIFA) was signed. It was intended to create a basis for expanding trade, economic and investment relations between the Central Asian countries and the United States. Afghanistan was included in the annual meetings of the TIFA Council as an observer. Thus, at the meeting of the Council on October 18, 2012 in Astana, among other issues, the problems of trade and transit in Central Asia and Afghanistan were discussed. As noted above, in 2005 a mechanism was launched to hold Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences on Afghanistan. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Burns, speaking at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on October 7, 2009, said: "The stable future of Afghanistan depends on continued assistance from our Central Asian partners, just as the stable future of Central Asia depends on success in suppressing militant extremists in Afghanistan. The energy resources of Central Asia can become a factor of stability and predictability in the global economy, providing a variety of sources, markets and transit routes for the delivery of energy carriers, while at the same time opening up new economic prospects for the region itself. Thus, the Americans are consistently promoting the idea of withdrawing the Central Asian region from the control of Russia and China. The goal is also to provide Afghanistan with a potential opportunity to restore the economy due to the dubious role of a transit corridor for energy and other resources in the foreseeable future and at the same time shift the main burden of costs to the Central Asian states. Thus, two main areas of influence of the armed confrontation in Afghanistan on the development of the political and economic situation in Central Asia can be distinguished. First, from Afghanistan came a real threat of a change in the political system in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Tajikistan, through the joint efforts of the parties, with the mediation of the UN and some states of the region, it was possible to integrate the opposition into the process of peaceful development. As for the Uzbek opposition, which fought in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban movement, it was seriously weakened during the military operations of the international coalition.

Although the weakening of government control and the resurgence of armed Taliban activity have become a constant part of the political life of Afghanistan in recent years, the recent surge in the expansion of the Taliban is often associated with the decision of US President Joe Biden to end the long-term presence of US military forces in Afghanistan, as well as the forces of NATO allies and operational partners, set out in his April speech at the White House. Justifying the withdrawal of American troops, as well as those of allies and partners, which should be completed by the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, he nevertheless referred to the diplomatic agreement between the US government and the Taliban on the withdrawal of troops before May 1, 2021, concluded after a period of "proper negotiations" and a duty he inherited from the previous administration. Indeed, the terms for

the withdrawal of American troops were agreed and signed between the Trump administration and the Taliban in February 2020 in exchange for Taliban promises to end violence, support terrorist organizations and start negotiations with the Afghan government. According to military officials, President Donald Trump even planned to withdraw troops by January, before Biden's inauguration. In general, the current withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan was the culmination of President Obama's plan to reduce the number of US troops in Afghanistan, which reached a record 110,000 in 2011, and finally withdraw from the country by 2016. In his July speech, President Biden was more specific, specifying that the US military mission in Afghanistan would end on August 31, citing the Command Staff's recommendations for an early withdrawal of troops, indicating that the goals of the military mission, the main of which was to stop the use of the territory of Afghanistan as bases for preparing attacks on the United States have been reached. This time, the withdrawal of troops is really moving fast, and, according to Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, is already 90% complete by the first days of July. Despite the emotionality of the statements, the actual number of American troops withdrawn by the end of August is 3,500 people, plus another 7,000 people from NATO and allies, which is only a small fraction of the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan a decade ago, but, nevertheless, the timing and haste of the withdrawal of troops caused serious criticism from all sides, although the withdrawal of troops and the end of this "eternal war" in itself did not raise questions from anyone. In an interview with the Associated Press, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, for example, called the mission a failure overall, as extremism in the country is "at its peak" and the withdrawal of troops leaves devastation in its wake, adding, however, that Afghanistan is certainly better off without the presence of foreign military. While Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the withdrawal "hasty", Chinese analysts were less restrained in their descriptions, calling the withdrawal of the US and NATO military also "irresponsible". A considerable amount of criticism related to the withdrawal of troops by the Trump and Biden administrations also came from American experts, who considered the unconditional withdrawal of troops in the absence of significant concessions from the Taliban as the reason for their military rise and sabotage of the peace process.

Women are required to have a male-relative companion when traveling significant distances and to cover their faces in public. Music has been banned and flogging, amputations, and mass executions have been reintroduced. According to a New York Times investigation, the Taliban has killed or forcibly disappeared nearly five hundred former government officials and members of the Afghan security forces in just its first six months in power. Afghans also remain at a heightened risk of terrorist attacks, such as the August 2022 bombing of a mosque and September 2022 bombing of the Russian Embassy, both in Kabul, allegedly perpetrated by the Islamic State.

Afghans are also suffering from cascading and compounding humanitarian crises and face the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, according to the United Nations. In January 2022, the United Nations launched the largest single-country aid appeal in its history to finance humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. By March 2022, 95 percent of Afghan households did not have enough to eat, and more than 3.5 million children were in need of nutrition treatment support. By August 2022, six million people were "on the brink of famine." Climate change, which has increased the frequency and intensity of natural disasters and

extreme weather, has elevated the population's exposure to food shortages, with searing heatwaves and flash flooding destroying crops and arable land. Afghans have also seen food prices soar as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war.

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has also been exacerbated by an economy on the verge of collapse and international isolation. Sanctions and the termination of significant development aid have crippled the Afghan economy. The revocation of the country's central bank's credentials halted all basic banking transactions and drastically restricted critical cash flow relied on by Afghan families for daily market activities. Furthermore, skyrocketing inflation has meant an over 50 percent increase in the price of goods since July 2021. Obtaining external assistance to contend with domestic economic havoc is complicated by the West's reticence to work with the Taliban government over concerns that doing so would bolster the regime's legitimacy. Despite the humanitarian exceptions issued by the United Nations, the United States, and other countries that have imposed sanctions on Afghanistan since the Taliban usurped power, the country remains starved for assistance. Additionally, no foreign government has to date formally recognized the Taliban and, as of December 2021, the UN Credentials Committee has deferred any formal decision on the Taliban's UN representation of Afghanistan. In May 2022, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released an interim assessment [PDF] of the United States' involvement in and withdrawal from Afghanistan. The report cited the decision "to withdraw military forces and contractors from Afghanistan" under the Doha Agreement (signed during the Donald J. Trump administration and confirmed by President Biden in April 2021) as the "single most important near-term factor in the ANDSF's collapse." Many Afghans viewed the agreement as "an act of bad faith" that signaled the U.S. government's intention to hand over the country to the Taliban while rushing to evacuate. The report also detailed nine factors explaining why the ANDSF was so poorly prepared to maintain security after the U.S. withdrawal after two decades of support "and nearly \$90 billion in U.S. security assistance," including the creation of U.S. "long-term dependencies" and "Afghan corruption." On August 1, 2022, President Biden announced the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden's successor as the leader of al-Qaida. A day prior, U.S. forces fired two Hellfire missiles on a house in downtown Kabul where U.S. intelligence indicated Zawahiri was residing as a guest of the Taliban.

Conclusion. For the Central Asian countries, the current instability in Afghanistan, linked to the withdrawal of US and NATO troops, the government's inability to maintain security, and the military expansion of the Taliban, poses an open threat that could have far-reaching consequences. With the end of the era of the American military presence, which certainly contained radical forces and maintained power in Afghanistan, the likelihood of a civil war, the fall of the constitutional regime, an increase in drug trafficking, cross-border extremist groups, and a huge flow of refugees could become serious security issues for the entire Central Asian region. Interestingly, even the 2012 reports on the likely consequences of the US troop withdrawal and subsequent instability in Afghanistan pointed to an almost identical list of security problems for the Central Asian countries, including a surge in radicalism, an increase in drug trafficking, and an influx of refugees, especially given the ethnic composition of northern Afghanistan. Although intelligence data pointed to the likely fall of the Afghan government within six months of the US withdrawal the speed and

effectiveness of the Taliban military advance and the collapse of the Afghan security forces were not foreseen by anyone, which forced the countries of Central Asia bordering Afghanistan - Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - to resort to an early increase in security through diplomatic and strategic steps. Despite the fact that the Taliban strongly assured about the inviolability of the borders of the Central Asian countries, as, for example, during their meeting with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Moscow, these countries fully undertook to strengthen the border zones, mobilization of reservists, military exercises and construction of refugee camps. Tajikistan mobilized 20,000 reservists to reinforce the Tadjik-Afghan border, as did Turkmenistan, although it did meet with a Taliban delegation in Ashgabat. Even Kazakhstan, although it does not border on Afghanistan, has brought the armed forces, according to the Deputy Minister of Defense, into a state of constant combat readiness, and the ministry monitors the situation with Afghanistan around the clock. Being a state with a long-term military presence in the region, as well as a member of several regional interstate security organizations, Russia from the first days of the Afghan crisis was actively involved in this issue through the structures of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), first of all organizing joint military exercises with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, having one of the largest military bases in Tajikistan, Russia has long been involved in supporting, equipping and training the border troops of Tajikistan and has already promised to supply Tajikistan with military equipment and technical assistance. While the Taliban already claim control of 85% of Afghanistan, including key areas and checkpoints along the borders with the countries of Central Asia, these countries are in full swing preparing the infrastructure for a likely influx of refugees, who are in Gorno- Up to 30,000 are expected in the Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan, and in the Uzbek city of Termez, on the border with Afghanistan, authorities have already built a refugee camp. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, which also does not border Afghanistan, asked the Tadjik authorities for assistance in moving Afghan Kyrgyz to the Kyrgyz-Tadjik border.

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