

VERBAL METAPHOR

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ABSTRACT

A verb metaphor gives the substitute subject verb new meaning by describing the action in a different way. This might be a jump to a related topic that enhances the intended meaning. It could also be done in purposeful contrast. Adverbial metaphors can further enrich verbal metaphors, which give action descriptions more nuance. Finding the vehicle first, then illustrative acts may be used to generate verb metaphors. As a result, verbs from the metaphor domain like "rickety" and "racy" may be employed to describe someone who has been transformed into an automobile. When the meaning and the metaphor diverge, this might be a purposeful, cynical contrast meant to draw attention to how the intended meaning is highlighted by contrast. In ordinary speech, a large number of verbs are metaphors. Therefore, despite its widespread use, "cutting someone off" does not actually signify cutting.[1:86]

Introduction: While analyzing multimodality in metaphors, it is common to approach the verbal and visual inputs as distinct phenomena that call for various interpretive techniques in order to arrive at a metaphoric interpretation. Conversely, this chapter makes the argument that understanding verbal, visual, and multimodal metaphors requires comparable brain processes. Regardless of the modal quality of the input, arriving at an interpretation of metaphors requires similar adaptations of conceptual information of texts and images as well as multimodal combinations, despite the fact that the perception of images varies from verbal decoding.[2:76]

She watched in horror as the dead bird floated down from the sky.

Broken in flight, the bird scythed down to the waiting moor.

He cut me off, yet still I carried his name.

This chapter compares and examines the comprehension of visual metaphors to that of verbal metaphors, mostly from the perspective of cognitive pragmatics (particularly within the framework of "relevance theory"), with occasional references to cognitive linguistics. This chapter's major thesis is that understanding verbal and visual metaphors requires comparable brain processes. While visual perception is clearly distinct from language decoding, in order to perceive visual metaphors, conceptual information must also be adjusted (a process known as conceptual upload during comprehension). [3:98]This is similar to how it works with verbal metaphors. Consequently, even though it is undeniable that the combination of verbal and visual inputs in multimodal metaphors can produce intriguing interpretive results—as the chapters in this book show—visual and verbal metaphors are frequently treated as separate phenomena in multimodality studies. This chapter, on the other hand, will make the case that both kinds of metaphors—as well as multimodal metaphors that combine text and image—are "decoded" by specific mental modules that provide schematic information that must be further refined inferentially to yield the desired interpretation. Similar to verbal metaphors, whose interpretation requires the hearer to inferentially adjust the concept that the speaker encodes in order to obtain the speaker's intended interpretation, visual metaphors can also be arranged on a scale based on the gap that exists between the prototypical referent of the image and the cartoonist's intended referent. In this sense, multimodal metaphors are described by Forceville as "metaphors whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes," whereas the cartoons examined in this chapter include metaphors of a pictorial/visual character. However, the model provided here can handle multimodal metaphors in the same way as metaphors with only verbal or only visual inputs, which is consistent with my main argument in this chapter.[4:77]

Comparing verbal and visual

I contend that the method in which the input is sent to the central inferential processor is the primary distinction between processing verbal and visual metaphors, with little to no variation. A context-free decoding of a linguistic string by the language module, in accordance with Fodor's theory of the modularity of mind, transmits a de-contextualized string of linguistic information to the central processor for inferential enrichment into a fully contextualized (and optimally relevant) interpretation that ostensibly corresponds to the speaker's intended one.

The perceptual module, on the other hand, is responsible for decoding visual input. Similar characteristics are shared by the language and perceptual modules:

(a) they are fast and automatic (i.e., capable of high-speed information transference and automatically activated by the appropriate type of input, either "linguistic" or "visual");

(b) they are domain-specific (i.e., both modules are activated by a specific type of input);

(c) they are a part of our genetic endowment (i.e., they are not "learned" and possess an evolutionary quality); and

(d) they have a consistent path of development (unfolding) across individuals and cultures. To put it briefly, when the right kind of information enters these cerebral modules, it automatically activates them and both produce decontextualized bits of evidence of the sender’s intention to communicate some information. This context-free information is then enriched inferen-tially

in order to obtain a fully satisfactory (i.e., relevant) interpretation of the verbal or visual input.[5:98] These characteristics of modules do not, however, imply that decisions are never formed at this stage of verbal or visual processing. For example, the language module frequently needs to select between two logical forms that might exist for the same linguistic string. Likewise, it has been shown that although if the perceptual module appears to match object and referent exactly, it is also forced to make decisions about which visual data it is truly processing. To be more precise, when readers understand a visual metaphor, they begin by recognizing the visual input, or experiencing the picture. This is accomplished by comparing the visual characteristics of the item or objects shown with previously stored information through a subconscious or sub-attentive comparison. Processing advances into a more deliberate stage of interpretation that is full of inferential activity when the image is intended to convey something to the readers beyond a mere perceptual perception. We have two main sorts of information stored in our minds that are constantly being updated and stabilized by subsequent visual views of the archetypal referents:

(a) Prototypical visual referent: an encyclopedia article that includes the visual components and characteristics that an object seen in a picture is usually composed of. For example, the archetypal referent of a picture of a cat would have visual characteristics (hair type, color, ears, whiskers, paws, etc.) that are remembered as typical of cats and that make a straightforward visual identification possible.

(b) Prototypical visual syntax: additional elements that are frequently connected to another object that is portrayed in a picture. Processing is often quicker when the visual arrangement of the objects in the picture corresponds to our memory of the normal visual syntax for these things—a kind of "visual schema" that informs and precedes actual perception. As with the "cat example" above, we should anticipate seeing graphic depictions of this species in specific scenarios with objects forming a prototypical visual syntax regard-ing its representation (e.g., cat on a branch, on a mat, playing with wool…). The effort required to analyze an image will generally decrease as the number of visual elements that correspond to the prototype visual referent grows and its prototypical visual syntax satisfies stored schemas. Highly iconic pictures often have characteristics that match the reader's prototype visual reference of the image; yet, other images may have characteristics that are less prototypical, leading to what are known as scales of iconicity.[6:45]

Additionally, both top-down and bottom-up processes are present in visual perception. Because the reader creates and incorporates the archetypal visual referents from the accessible visual materials, it is bottom-up. However, it is also top-down in that readers compare the visual information to their mental database of standard visual referents, effectively anticipating and even influencing the reader's perception of the item in the picture.8 The perceptual module is constantly being updated and revised by successive visual impressions of comparable pictures, drawing from a conceptual repertoire that encompasses a variety of visual referents.[7:90]

Conclusion.

To comprehend the reasons behind the metaphorical interpretation of certain visuals, it is crucial to refer back to the earlier section on vision. The detection of an incongruity that appears between the actual visual configuration of the image or images that make up the visual

metaphor and the activation of the stored prototypical visual referents during perception, in my opinion, is the key to moving from a purely denotative interpretation of the image, which is often sub-attentive, to a connotative metaphoric interpretation, loaded with inferential processing. This concept involves a greater mental effort to go beyond a visually sub-attentive perception and into an effort-demanding inferential activity to find the appropriate elements that can be metaphorically transferred from what we can refer to as "the source image" to what we can refer to as "the target image." The reader must, of course, grasp the intended metaphoric interpretation—or their own interpretation—as we move into this inferential phase. The image creator can only hope that the reader will be able to identify the relevant encyclopedic features associated with the visual referents of the images and deduce which ones are involved in the metaphoric interpretation.

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