THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE

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ABSTRACT

Each language is unique and has its own characteristics. A person who speaks any foreign language uses a diversity of lexical units, uses various grammatical and phonetic laws of the language. Withal, speakers often find themselves helpless in the face of the simplest speech situations that require linguistic behavior corresponding to a specific communicative strategy. There are paradoxes of speech conversation : a person from time to time feels a complete incapability to verbal interaction with other members of the same language community. And the point is ignorance of the language - the point is usually the inability to use it correctly, that is, the incapability to "place" oneself in a particular speech situation.

In the 20th century, against the background of the development of new directions, the metaphor becomes for linguistics as a whole a certain unifying phenomenon, the study of which lays the foundation for the development of cognitive science. Withal, until the last decades of the 20th century, when the problem of the status of metaphor in conceptual theory began to attract special attention of linguists, studies on this subject were random and did not stand out as separate substantiated theories. On the one hand, metaphor presupposes the existence of similarities between the properties of its semantic referents, since it must be understood, and on the other hand, dissimilarity between them, since the metaphor is designed to create some new meaning.

In the history of linguistics, there have been several interpretations of the issue of classification of metaphors. Different researchers singled them out into certain types, developed various approaches and criteria, in accordance with which they then distributed metaphors into different classes.

Within the framework of the metonymic (based on the adjacency of concepts) strategy, two options are outlined, the metonymic phenomenological strategy and the metonymic noumenonological strategy. The first sets the conceptualization through examples, samples, or simply through individual manifestations. For example, love can be conceptualized through examples of couples in love - Romeo and Juliet, Tristan and Isolde, Master and Margarita - or through manifestations of love: "Love is kisses, dates, excitement."

The second strategy uses hypernyms. This is a classic definition through genus and species specificity: "Love is a feeling that arises between a man and a woman." Both strategies are based on adjacency relations. One phenomenon is defined through another, homogeneous to it. The connection between phenomena is present in fact.

Homogeneous components are manifestations of metonymicity (adjacency) against the background of a metaphorical strategy (similarity). With these manifestations, the phenomenal world enters the metaphor, it ceases to be an arbitrary conjecture to the phenomenon of an alien reality, a motive arises that binds it to reality, limiting the degree of freedom of metaphorical search. The presence of homogeneous components in a heterogeneous metaphor creates an limitless semantic perspective. In the metaphor, the comparison component is eliminated. In the symbol, the assimilation zone is not closed. Hence the exhaustibility of the symbol, which is invariably emphasized in aesthetics. The selected strategies are based on the presumption of metaphor, and the symbol is interpreted as a metaphor, complicated by adjacency relations.

In sum up, I argue that this grounding hypothesis contains some problematic conceptual ambiguities and, under many reasonable interpretations, empirical difficulties. I give evidence that there are foundational obstacles to defining a coherent and cognitively valid concept of "metaphor" and "concrete meaning," and some general problems with singling out certain domains of experience as more immediate than others. I conclude from these considerations that whatever the facts are about the comprehension of individual metaphors, the accessible evidence is incompatible with the notion of an underlying conceptual structure organized according to the immediacy of experience.

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